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I. Introduction: Hal and Wendy's Divorce and
Wendy's Tort Action'
Hal and Wendy married twenty-five years ago and lived together in a
jointly owned home for eighteen years. They have no children.
About five years ago, Hal and Wendy's marriage became troubled. Hal
began seeing other women, but kept this fact from Wendy. Wendy began
seeing other men, but kept this fact from Hal.
Hal and Wendy lived together intermittently over the next two years,
alternating between periods of alienation and reconciliation. Hal shuttled
between the marital home and a nearby rented apartment. Their sexual
relationship followed a similar path.
One day, Wendy saw Hal with one of his girlfriends and became furious.
She proclaimed reconciliation was impossible, hired a lawyer, and sued
Hal for divorce. Hal, who claimed to still love Wendy, answered her
complaint and tried to stall the divorce process as much as possible. Their
sexual relationship continued intermittently.
Wendy resolved to end her marriage to Hal when she decided to marry
her most recent lover, Joe. At Wendy's insistence, Wendy and Hal began
negotiations for a settlement leading to a consent divorce.
During the period of negotiations, Wendy noticed small blisters near
her vulva. Wendy's doctor diagnosed her as infected with the herpes
simplex virus. Her sores crusted over and healed; the virus became latent.
Wendy is receiving appropriate medication.
Wendy's fury against Hal reached volcanic proportions after her diagnosis. While Wendy had sexual intercourse with other men during the
periods of separation from Hal, she firmly believes Hal deliberately infected her during their "on again, off again period."
Wendy's lawyer advised her that she could file a tort action for damages
against Hal alleging deliberate or negligent transmission of the herpes
virus. 2 When her lawyer brought up the idea, Wendy feared that if she
filed the tort suit before the divorce settlement was concluded, Hal would
use it as an excuse to delay reaching an agreement. She wanted a divorce
as quickly as possible to marry Joe.
Wendy's lawyer agreed with Wendy's strategic analysis. He advised
Wendy not to mention her potential tort claim to Hal or file suit until
after the divorce decree was final. The lawyer also told Wendy he would

1.Wendy and Hal's story is an amalgam of the following cases: Overberg v. Lusby, 727
F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Ky. 1990); Stuart v. Stuart, 143 Wis. 2d 377, 421 N.W.2d 505 (1988);
J.Z.M. v. S.M.M., 226 N.J. Super. 642, 545 A.2d 249 (1988); Stafford v. Stafford, 726 S.W.2d
14 (Sup. Ct. Tex. 1987); S.A.V. v. K.G.V., 708 S.W.2d 651 (Sup. Ct. Mo. 1986); and McNevin
v.McNevin, 447 N.E.2d 611 (Ct. App. Ind. 1983). The facts are chosen to raise clearly the
legal issues on which this article focuses.
2. See R.A.P. v. B.J.P., 428 N.W.2d 103 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988); Maharam v. Maharam,
123 A.D.2d 165, 510 N.Y.S.2d 104 (1986).
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not mention the possible tort claim to Hal's lawyer or the judge. Wendy's
required financial disclosure statement thus did not list her potential tort
claim in the column under "assets." Hal never became aware of Wendy's
tort claim until after the divorce was final.
Hal and Wendy settled their known differences, divided their assets
fifty-fifty (everything of substance either owned was marital property),
and signed a separation agreement. Wendy's lawyer believed that, absent
the tort claim, the division of assets closely approximated the way the
divorce court would have decided the matter had agreement not been
reached.
Wendy and Hal's agreement contained a clause stating that they "have
made a full and complete disclosure of all the assets that have been accumulated during the term of the marriage." It did not, however, contain
a general release clause.
On stipulation, the divorce court granted Wendy a divorce after a brief
inquest. The separation agreement was incorporated into the court's decree.
As planned, on the last day within the period of the applicable statute
of limitations, Wendy filed a tort action against Hal. She seeks thousands
of dollars in compensatory and punitive damages. The lawyer representing
Wendy in the tort action is the same lawyer who represented her in the
divorce action.
Hal's answer denies Wendy's allegations, and raises the affirmative
defense of res judicata. Hal then immediately moves to dismiss Wendy's
complaint, arguing that her "interspousal tort" claim should have been
litigated in her divorce action.

II. Overview
With varying levels of enthusiasm, a number of recent cases from different
states hold that Hal's motion will be denied. In these states, Wendy will
be allowed to litigate her tort claim in a subsequent separate action, even
though she deliberately concealed her intention to file suit from Hal and
the divorce court during the divorce action.'
In effect, these courts exempt Wendy's interspousal tort claim from the
basic principle ofresjudicata: "[a] party should not be allowed to relitigate
3. Abbott v. Williams, 888 F.2d 1550 (11 th Cir. 1989) (interpreting Alabama law);
Nelson v. Jones, 787 P.2d 1031 (Sup. Ct. Alaska 1990); de laCroix de Lafayette v. de la
Croix de Lafayette, 15 Fain. L. Rep. (BNA) 1501 (D.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 14, 1989); Stuart v.
Stuart. 143 Wis. 2d 377, 421 N.W.2d 505 (1988); McCoy v. Cooke, 165 Mich. App. 662,
419 N.W.2d 44 (1988); Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369 (Sup. Ct. Utah 1988); Heacock v.
Heacock. 402 Mass. 21, 520 N.E.2d 151 (1988); Simmons v. Simmons, 773 P.2d 602 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1988); Nash v. Overholser, 114 Idaho 461, 757 P.2d 1180(1988); Slansky v. Slansky,
556 A.2d 94 (Sup. Ct. Vt. 1988); Aubert v. Aubert, 529 A.2d 909 (S.Ct. N.H. 1987); McNevin
v. McNevin, 447 N.E.2d 611 (Ct. App. Ind. 1983).
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a matter that it already had the opportunity to litigate." They reason that
Wendy's divorce and tort claims are separate and independent causes of
action that do not have to be joined in a single proceeding. Typical is a
recent pronouncement of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court:
A tort action is not based on the same underlying claim as an action for
divorce. The purpose of a tort action is to redress a legal wrong in damages;
that of a divorce action is to sever the marital relationship between the parties,
and, where appropriate, to fix the parties' respective rights and obligations
with regard to alimony and support, and to divide the marital estate. Although
a judge in awarding alimony and dividing marital property must consider,
among other things, the conduct of the parties during the marriage, the purpose for which these awards are made do not include compensating a party
in damages for injuries suffered. The purpose of an award of alimony is to
provide economic support to a dependent spouse, that of the division of
marital property is to recognize and equitably recompense the parties' respective contributions to the marital partnership.'
A significant minority of courts, however, do not concur in the "different causes of action" analysis. Rather, applying the "same transaction"
test,6 they hold that Wendy's subsequently filed interspousal tort action
is barred by res judicata. 7 These courts reason, in essence, that Wendy's
action for divorce and her tort claim both evolve from a common factual
nucleus and raise interrelated economic issues that should be resolved in
a single proceeding. They view the parties and their marital relationship
as the appropriate basic unit of litigation, not the different legal theories
that can be placed on events that occurred during the marriage.
The majority-minority split has great significance because of two social
trends: an increase in divorce litigation and an increase in the receptiveness of the courts to providing compensation for torts committed by one
spouse against another during marriage.
"[Jiudicial resources are finite and the number of cases that can be
heard by the court is limited. Every dispute that is reheard means that
another will be delayed." 8 State court dockets are crowded. Divorce litigation comprises a major portion of the caseload of many large state court

4. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 11.2 at 589 (3d ed. 1985) [hereinafter
JAMES & HAZARD].

5. Heacock v. Heacock, 402 Mass. 21, 520 N.E.2d 151, 153 (1988).
6. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24(l) (1982).
7. Smith v. Smith, 530 So. 2d 1389 (Sup. Ct. Ala. 1988); Kemp v. Kemp, 723 S.W.2d
138 (Ct. App. Tenn. 1986); Tevis v. Tevis, 79 N.J. 422, 400 A.2d 1189, 1196 (1979). Cf
Boronow v. Boronow, 71 N.Y.2d 284, 519 N.E.2d 1375. 525 N.Y.S.2d 179 (1988) (ex-spouse
generally precluded from raising questions of title to property in a subsequent action if full
and fair opportunity to litigate those questions in the divorce action); Partlow v. Kolupa,
122 A.D.2d 509. 504 N.Y.S.2d 870 (1986), afd nen. 69 N.Y.2d 927, 509 N.E.2d 327, 516
N.Y.S.2d 632 (1987) (subsequent conversion action filed by wife barred by divorce judgment): Davis v. Dieujuste, 496 So. 2d 806 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1986) (property rights).
8. J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 14.3 at 615 (1985)
[hereinafter FRIEDENTHAL, KANE & MILLER].
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systems.9 The policy interest in conserving scarce judicial resources by
concentrating all claims between the divorcing couple into a single proceeding is thus great and weighs in favor of a broad application of res
judicata principles.
There is also a related social interest in reducing the private transaction
costs (the most significant component of which is legal fees) of settling
marital differences. Divorce is generally a zero sum economic transaction:
there is not enough money in the marital settlement pot for both spouses
to live postdivorce at the same standard of living as before the divorce.
Increasing the transaction costs of the divorce settlement by reopening
proceedings reduces further the total resources available for the postdivorce family to live on. The result of allowing Wendy to file her tort claim
after the divorce settlement may be to transfer more money from Hal to
Wendy; Hal, however, will be poorer, and both Hal's and Wendy's lawyers
will be richer.
Also weighing in favor of a broad application of res judicata is the
policy of repose that underlies it.i' Divorce is a wrenching, all-consuming
emotional experience," perhaps more so than the events underlying most
other kinds of litigation. It rips apart the basic social institution that
provides emotional stability and security for individuals.' 2 Hal's and
Wendy's well-being, and their continued productive functioning as members of society, require that their emotional stability be reestablished
quickly and firmly by a final settlement of marital differences.' 3
Giving Wendy a second chance to raise an interspousal tort claim also
means she need not disclose her intention to sue Hal the first time around.
Hal thus has no opportunity to attempt to negotiate settlement of the tort
claim as part of the divorce settlement. He has a more than colorable
basis for arguing that the rules of procedure discourage Wendy and her

9. In New York in 1988, for example, uncontested matrimonial actions numbered 48,185.
Notes of issue indicating readiness for trial were filed in 9,488 matrimonial cases. The total
number of notes of issue disposed of was 62,752. Telephone interview with Chester Mount,
Manager of Data Services, New York State Office of Court Administration (October 23,
1989). Apparently, no similar statistics are kept on a national level. Telephone interview
with Todd Stickel. Staff of the National Center for State Courts, Williamsburg, Virginia
(August 18, 1989).
10. FRIEDENTHAL, KANE & MILLER, supra note 8, § 14.3 at 615.
11.See generalltJ.WALLERSTEIN &J. KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAK-UP: How PARENTS
AND CHILDREN COPE WITH DIVORCE (1980).
12. C. LASCH, HAVEN IN A HEARTLESS WORLD (1977); Demos, Images of the American
Famnil'. Then andNow in CHANGING IMAGES OF THE FAMILY 43-60 (V. Tufte & B. Myerhoff,
eds. 1979). ("[W]e have isolated family life as the primary setting-if not, in fact, the only
one-for caring relationships between people") (emphasis in original).

13. See Boronow v. Boronow, 71 N.Y.2d 284, 290-91, 519 N.E.2d 1375, 1378-79, 525
N.Y.S.2d 179, 183 (1988) (parties generally precluded from subsequently litigating questions
of title to property if had full and fair opportunity to raise them in divorce action) ("Fragmentation in this area would be particularly inappropriate and counterproductive ...a
continuation of the relationship and of the conflict among parties to a matrimonial litigation
would be particularly perverse ...").
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lawyer from being fully candid in the divorce settlement negotiations.
Procedural rules reflect a vision of how parties in a dispute should
communicate with each other. Allowing relitigation of issues that should
have been resolved in the first divorce proceeding encourages the notion
that divorcing spouses are allowed to "sandbag" each other by somewhat
deceptive strategic behavior during divorce settlement negotiations.
Courts recognize the importance of the social and private interests in
stability of marital judgments and settlements by placing a heavy burden
on a divorce litigant who challenges a separation agreement after the
fact.' 4 Broad application of res judicata to divorce actions serves these
same ends.
The policies favoring a broad application of res judicata to bar subsequently filed interspousal torts must, however, be carefully balanced against
the policies favoring justice in the individual case and practicality. Wendy
is not a victim of grotesque physical abuse, but many other married women
are. In the past decade, our collective social consciousness has been raised
to recognize the serious problems of spousal abuse and domestic violence. 5 Courts have generally expanded the possibility of recovery for
such tortious conduct by abolishing common law husband-wife immunity.' 6 Requiring a brutalized spouse to assert a claim for tort for harm
inflicted during the marriage in a divorce action, some fear, may simply
enrage the abuser more and cause the wife more harm.
These concerns can be conceptually supported by the argument that
Wendy's claims for tort and divorce are so fundamentally different that
they should not be joined in a single proceeding. Wendy's divorce claim
is simply designed to sever her marriage to Hal and to determine the
economic rights resulting therefrom. Her tort action, in contrast, is de14. In essence, a litigant challenging a separation agreement has to show either (a) that
the agreement is substantively unconscionable (a bargain " 'such as no [person] in his [or
her] senses and not under delusion would make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair
[person] would accept on the other.' " Christian v. Christian, 42 N.Y.2d 63, 71, 396 N.Y.S.2d
817, 823, 365 N.E.2d 849, 855 (1977) quoting Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406, 411,
(1889) or (b) that the agreement was reached through a procedure that, in its totality, reeks
of fraud or duress by one spouse. Id.
15. The scope of the problem is only partially captured in the following statistics: at least
1.8 million women are battered every year. Some form of domestic violence occurs in 25
percent of all marriages. About 20 percent of the women seeking emergency surgical procedures are victims of domestic violence. Newsweek, Dec. 12, 1988, at 59. The reported appellate cases indicate that women are the plaintiffs in the great percentage of interspousal
tort claims filed following divorce. Men too, however, file such claims. In a recent Alaska
Supreme Court case, for example, an ex-husband sued his ex-wife for abuse of process,
defamation, and malicious prosecution based on false allegations of child abuse in criminal
and child protective proceedings that were concluded before the divorce action was settled.
The Court held the husband's claims were not barred by the divorce settlement. Nelson v.
Jones, 787 P.2d 1031 (Sup. Ct. Alaska 1990).
16. A recent decision of the Texas Supreme Court which abolished husband-wife immunity completely listed thirty-nine jurisdictions which abolished the doctrine in whole or
part. Price v. Price, 732 S.W.2d 316, 319 (Sup. Ct. Tex. 1987). See generally 92 A.L.R.2d
901.
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signed to punish Hal and compensate Wendy because Hal breached the
minimum standards of care and decency towards Wendy required of all
members of a civilized society, irrespective of marital status. I7 Given these
different purposes, it can be argued that Wendy's tort and the divorce
claims should also be procedurally separate. Or, at the very least, joinder
should be permissive, not mandatory. 8
Furthermore, problems of judicial administration arise should res judicata compel the joinder of tort and divorce actions. The most prominent
is the right to a jury trial. 19 Historically, divorce claims have been tried
by a judge and tort claims decided by a jury. Inevitably, when divorce
and tort claims are joined in a single proceeding, problems will arise as
to who the finder of fact should be and in what order the overlapping
issues should be decided. Additionally, lawyers for plaintiffs in tort actions are generally allowed to charge contingent fees; 20 lawyers in divorce
2
actions are generally not. '
Finally, overlaying tort litigation on divorce claims may make divorce
litigation unmanageable. Some fear that requiring litigation of interspousal torts in a divorce action may undermine the policy premises of
no-fault divorce.2 2 Fear of res judicata may encourage divorce litigants to
scrape the "bottom of the barrel" and assert every conceivable tort claim
that arose during the marriage. 23 Divorce litigation will thus become more
bitter and hostile than it already is.24 Others fear that divorce litigation
will become unmanageable as tort claims and third parties are added to
2
joined tort/divorce litigation. 1
The thesis of this article is that, despite these concerns, as a general
rule, spouses should be required to litigate tort claims against each other
17. Note, Interspousal Torts and Divorce: Problems, Policies, Procedures, 27 J. FAM. L.
489 (1988-89).
18. Id. at 498.
19. See, e.g., Abbott v. Williams, 888 F.2d 1550, 1554 (1 1th Cir. 1989) (interpreting
Alabama law): Stuart v. Stuart, 143 Wis. 2d 377, 421 N.W.2d 505, 508 (1988).
20. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(c) (1983); MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-20 (1979).
21. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(d)(1) (1983); MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-20 (1979).
22. Simmons v. Simmons, 773 P.2d 602 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988); Goldman v. Wexler, 122
Mich. App. 744. 333 N.W.2d 121, 122 (1983).
23. Cf JAMES & HAZARD. supra note 4, § 11.2 at 600 (discussing the problem in the
context of the application of res judicata to all civil litigation).
24. Cf Nash v. Overholser, 114 Idaho 461, 757 P.2d 1180, 1184-85 (Sup. Ct. Utah 1988)
(concurring opinion) (almost never a convenient trial unit to combine tort and divorce action
because joining them compounds bitterness and hostility of divorce and custody proceedings). But cf Stuart v. Stuart, 143 Wis. 2d 377, 421 N.W.2d 505, 510 (1988) (concurring
opinion) ("If at all possible, the parties in a divorce should best be able to terminate their
relationships [in a single action]. They will have enough problems with the care, custody and
support of children without having wounds reopened after the marriage is terminated regarding prior existing claims").
25. Stuart v. Stuart, 143 Wis. 2d 377, 421 N.W.2d 505, 507 (1988); Lord v. Shaw, 665
P.2d 1288, 1291 (Sup. Ct. Utah 1983).
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that arose during the marriage relationship in the divorce action, or lose
them. This proposed rule flows from the general thrust of both modern
procedural and divorce reform, which encourage resolution of all grievances between a divorcing couple in a single proceeding. While claims for
tort and divorce serve different social purposes, the facts establishing both
claims and relief the plaintiff receives are inextricably intertwined. Modern rules of procedure generally compel parties to join such interconnected
claims. The problems that the opponents of mandatory joinder foresee
can be solved in a modern procedural system; careful judicial administration can prevent loss of jury trial rights and inequitable application or
undue complication of the divorce action. Modern courts are capable of
dealing with claims based on different legal theories arising out of a single
factual base in one litigation.
III. Organization of This Article
This article first summarizes the historical evolution of res judicata and
the divorce action. Both have broadened considerably in the modern era,
as exemplified by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Restatement
(Second) of Judgments, and no-fault divorce and equitable distribution
laws.
This article will then apply the transactional analysis test of res judicata
to the problem of an interspousal tort action filed after a divorce action.
Using the test of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments26 to determine
whether a factual grouping constitutes a single claim, this article will
analyze whether: (1) there is a common factual nucleus between the divorce and the interspousal tort; (2) the claims make a convenient trial
unit; and (3) the parties and society expect both claims to be resolved in
a single piece of litigation.

IV. Evolution of Res Judicata and the
Divorce Action
A. Definition of Terms
Definitions borrowed from a standard civil procedure textbook suffice to
begin the historical overview:
"Res judicata" refers to the various ways in which a judgment in one action
will have a binding effect in another. This includes the effect of the former
judgment where the latter action proceeds on all or part of the very claim
which was the subject of the former. In traditional terminology, this is called
merger or bar; in modern terminology it is called claim preclusion. A second
effect is traditionally known as collateral estoppel and now is called issue
26.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS

§ 24 comment b (1982).
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preclusion. It has to do with an issue determined in a first action when the
same issue arises in a later action based on a different claim or demand.2This article focuses on whether the "claim preclusion" branch of res judicata bars an interspousal tort action filed after a final divorce judgment.
The terms "claim" and "issue" preclusion came into general usage after
the author went to law school, and it is hard to teach an old dog new
tricks. This article, therefore, somewhat inaccurately uses the broader
term "res judicata" to mean claim, not issue preclusion. "Collateral estoppel" is used to refer to "issue preclusion."
B. The Expansion of Res Judicata
The scope of res judicata has expanded as a necessary complement to the
modern expansion of the scope of pleading, joinder, and discovery, whose
ultimate embodiment is the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Federal
Rules, in turn, have served as both a stimulus to and a reflection of state
28
procedural reform.
Before the Federal Rules, res judicata concepts were limited by the very
nature of common law and Code pleading: (a) a focus on technical forms
of action and pleading; and (b) the general absence of pretrial discovery.
The scope of res judicata was limited to the opportunity that the rules of
pleading and joinder gave the litigant to raise and discover claims and
issues. It would have been unfair to bar a litigant from raising a claim in
a subsequent action if he or she did not have the opportunity to litigate
29
it in the first action.
The common law pleading system, with its separation of law and equity,
its multiple writs, and absence of discovery was "not a comprehensive
investigation of responsibility for an alleged injury. And the basis for
precluding relitigation of an issue was not that a party had already had
an opportunity to litigate the issue but that it could not contradict a record
to which it was a party. More fundamentally, inasmuch as common law
procedure required narrow formulation of issues and limited opportunity
for development of proofs, it accorded a judgment correspondingly limited effects in precluding further litigation."30
Code pleading, while formulated in more modern language than the
common law pleading it replaced in some states, was similarly constricted
in scope. For example, the claims which a plaintiff could join under the
Field Code were defined in terms that parallel the common law forms of
action. Joinder was permitted, furthermore, only if the "causes of action... belong[ed] to only one of these classes, and must equally affect
27. JAMES & HAZARD, supra note 4, § 11.3 at 590.
28. See FRIEDENTHAL, KANE & MILLER, supra note 8, § 5.1 at 238-39 (discussing the
intertwined history of state and federal pleading reform).
29. Hazard, Forms ofAction Underthe FederalRules of Civil Procedure, 63 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 628. 638 (1988) [hereinafter Hazard].
30. JAMES & HAZARD, supra note 4, § 11.2 at 589.
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all the parties to the action, and not require different places of trial."'"
"The structure of the Field Code, following the pattern of the common
law, created what amounted to jurisdictional differentiations between
types of wrongs ....
These jurisdictional boundaries compressed litigation
into narrowly defined substantive categories ....
[I]n principle, every case
stood on a single substantive bottom. ' 32 Litigation was simple. The rules
of procedure required the plaintiff to fragment her claims into separate
segments based on different legal theories and prevented her from discovering facts in the possession of the other side that might have expanded
her claim.
As in the common law, under Code pleading the scope of res judicata
was limited to the litigant's opportunity to present claims under the governing rules of pleading and joinder. Res judicata was defined in terms
of the "cause of action" that a plaintiff raised in the first litigation. "The
definitions of res judicata under the Field Code were cast in such terms
as 'same evidence,' 'same basic right,' etc. Collectively these responses
constituted a body of res judicata law almost as arcane as common law
pleading. These complications ultimately derived from the same fundamental source, i.e., the fact that the procedural system was predicated on
33
differentiation of substantive claims."
Thus, under common law and Code pleading res judicata ultimately
focused on semantics rather than substance:
All these definitions were in a sense question-begging. They did not specify
what the remedial right, substantive right, or primary right was, and those
terms could be given a wider or narrower meaning in any given case.. . The
"same evidence" test similarly left unanswered the question, "Evidence of
34
what-evidence of liability, of all losses, or of particular losses?"
The narrow focus of res judicata pleading thus encouraged additional
litigation because of uncertainty over the scope of what was decided in
previous actions. Res judicata was a minimalist doctrine, "permit[ting]
relitigation of any question except the narrow one of whether the prior
action correctly decided the issues necessarily involved in awarding the
35
judgment that was actually awarded."
The Federal Rules embodied a revolutionary change in the way courts
and lawyers thought about the basic unit of litigation. They abolished the
distinction between law and equity, 36 and created the unified civil action. 37 They focused pleading on substance, not form. 38 Even more sig31.

supra note 29, at 630
143, at 157
32. Id. at 632.
33. Id. at 638.
HAZARD,

PRACTICE AND PLEADING §

quoting FIRST REPORT OF THE COIMISSIONERS ON
(1848).

34. JAMES & HAZARD, supra note 4, § 11.8 at 599.

35. Id. § 11.2 at 588.
36. FED. R. Cv. P. 1.
37. FED. R. Clv. P. 2.

38. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
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nificantly for present purposes, the Rules adopted the concept of the
compulsory counterclaim "aris[ing] out of the same transaction or oc.currence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim."3 9 The
Rules also considerably broadened the rules of joinder of parties and
claims from common law and Code pleading. As to joinder of claims, the
Federal Rules provided that all claims between two opposing parties may
be asserted in a single action.40 They also move toward the proposition
that all persons who are significant participants in an out-of-court transaction should be parties to any litigation that results from it."' As the
Supreme Court stated in the famous Gibbs case: "[u]nder the Rules, the
impulse is towards the broadest possible scope of action consistent with
fairness to the parties; joinder of claims, parties and remedies is strongly
encouraged."42 Finally, the Rules broadened pretrial discovery, requiring,
in essence, that each party make most of the facts underlying its case
43
available to the other side before trial begins.
The concept of res judicata was transformed by the increase in the
initial opportunity to litigate created by modern procedure. The focus of
res judicata analysis shifted from the legal form of what was litigated to
the underlying factual base that was the subject of the previous case.
Transactional analysis generally superseded the "primary right" or "same
evidence" analysis. "A transaction or a series of closely connected transactions is the basic unit of litigation, regardless of the variations in legal
theories, primary rights, grounds, evidence, or requested remedies."4 While
the Federal Rules permitted broad joinder of claims, the correlative rule
of claim preclusion they engendered requires, absent extenuating circumstances, that all theories of claim and remedy arising from a single trans45
action be asserted in a single action.
There is little doubt that a state procedural system that follows the
transactional philosophy of the Federal Rules and the Restatement (Second) of Judgments would create a strong presumption that Wendy should
bring her tort claim against Hal in the initial divorce action. Indeed, if
Hal sued Wendy for divorce instead of vice versa, and the state had a
compulsory counterclaim rule applicable to all civil actions identical to
Federal Rule 13(a), 46 Wendy would likely have to file her tort claim or
39. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a). See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
40. FED. R. Civ. P. 18(a).
41. FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a). See Hazard, supra note 29, at 628-29.
42. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966).
43. FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
44. FRIEDENTHAL, KANE & MILLER, supra note 8, § 14.4 at 627.
45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 comment c (1982).
46. Over thirty states have a compulsory counterclaim rule identical or similar to FED.
R. Civ. P. 13(a). Comparator, Compulsory Counterclaims, Fed. Proc. Rules Service, FED.
R. Civ. P. 13(a) (1989-90). States which take a limited view of the effect of res judicata in
divorce actions, however, treat interspousal tort claims as exceptions to the general compulsory counterclaim rule. See Nelson v. Jones, 787 P.2d 1031 (Sup. Ct. Alaska 1990);
Simmons v. Simmons, 773 P.2d 602 (Colo. App. 1988). Cf Slansky v. Slansky, 556 A.2d 94,
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lose it. She knew of the tort claim at the time of the divorce action. At
least superficially, her tort claim seems to "aris[e] -out of the transaction
or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim."
The thrust of modern procedure puts the burden on Wendy to explain
why she should or could not litigate her tort claim in the divorce action.
C. The Expansion of the Modern Divorce Action
The question then arises whether there is something unique about the
combination of a divorce action and an interspousal tort that should
exempt Wendy's tort claim from compulsory joinder with her divorce
action. The recent history of the action for divorce, however, suggests
quite the contrary: its scope has dramatically expanded, both substantively and procedurally.
England was largely a divorceless society until 1857, with Parliament
legislatively granting a few absolute divorces (divorce a vinculo matrimonii, freeing the parties to remarry) to a few wealthy people on the basis
of adultery. The common people had to be satisfied with a divorce from
bed and board (divorce a mensa et thoro), a form of legal separation
administered by the ecclesiastical courts, which did not allow remar47
riage.
The American colonies did not have ecclesiastical courts. They did,
however, initially adopt the English view that "[a]bsolute divorce was
unknown, divorce from bed and board very rare." 48 Some divorces in the
colonies were granted by legislatures or the executive, but they were the
exception rather than the rule.
After independence, the states began to liberalize the availability of
divorce, and transferred responsibility for administering it from the legislature to the judiciary.49 When state legislatures began to allow divorce,
and transfer the business of granting it to judges, they generally permitted
only a spouse who could show she was virtuous, and the other spouse a
sinner, to get a divorce. Proof of marital fault-adultery, cruel and in50
human treatment, abandonment-became the key to access to divorce.
During this period, hypocrisy generally pervaded divorce law. Most
divorces occurred because both spouses ultimately wanted them. Under
the fault system, they and their lawyers had to manufacture facts at perfunctory hearings to satisfy the fault grounds specified in the statute. Few
spouses who contested fault actually wanted to remain married to their
n. I (Vt. Sup. Ct. 1988) quoting VT. R. Cv. P. 80(f) ("[flailure of the defendant in an action
for divorce to counterclaim for divorce or nullity of the marriage or any other claim shall
not bar a subsequent action therefor").
47. See Mueller, Inquiry into the State of a Divorceless Society: Domestic Relations Law
and Aorals in England from 1660 to 1857, 18 U. Pin-. L. REV. 545 (1957).
48. L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 204 (2d ed. 1985).
49. See generally id. at 202, 204-08.
50. See id. at 498-504.
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errant spouse. Instead, they used fault as a bargaining wedge to increase
the errant spouse's purchase price for the freedom to remarry. In those
few cases in which the grounds for divorce were actually litigated, the
trial began from the premise that the breakdown of a marriage can be
attributed to the wrongdoing of one spouse. This premise did not comport
with the evolving social sense that the acts of marital fault were a symptom, not the cause, of deeper underlying problems in the marriage relationship.5'
A sea change in the availability of absolute divorce began in the 1960s
with California's famous "no-fault" divorce reform.12 Many states abolished fault grounds for divorce altogether; others superimposed no-fault
grounds such as "irreconcilable differences" on the traditional fault
grounds.53 The wisdom of such changes is still hotly debated, and the
actual statutes of most states reflect continuing political tension on the
availability of absolute divorce. Nonetheless, it is certainly a fair general
observation that absolute divorce is today far more broadly available to
most people in the United States than it was thirty years ago.
Economic relief required by divorce has similarly expanded. Under the
fault divorce regime, the scope of marital property distributed in a divorce
action was generally largely limited to tangibles. Nonmonetary contributions (such as homemaker services) and intangible property rights were
generally excluded from the marital "pot." Formal title ownership was
the key to the distribution.5 4 A spouse at fault for the marital dissolution
could be punished by a lesser distribution of marital assets. 5
The principles governing economic distributions at divorce in recent
years have broadened beyond formal title ownership and fault to include
consideration of contributions to the marital enterprise and need. 6 Property in the marital pot for distribution now includes intangibles such as
degrees, licenses, and pensions.57 The importance of formal title owner-

51. See M. WHEELER, NO-FAULT DIVORCE 2-18 (1974).
52. See CALIFORNIA GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON THE FAMILY, REPORT (1966). For a
history of the report and evaluation of its effects by one of its most distinguished members,
see Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault Divorce and Its Aftermath, 56
U. CINN. L. REV. 1 (1987). For a cross-cultural perspective, see M. GLENDON, ABORTION
AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 64-81 (1987).
53. See Freed & Walker, Family Law in the Fifty States: An Overview, 21 FAM. L.Q. 367,
383-84 ("[ajll American jurisdictions now have some form of no-fault divorce") and 417,
441-42 (1988) ("twenty states retain fault grounds in addition to one or more no fault
grounds").
54. See Younger, Marital Regimes: A Storv of Compromise and Demoralization, Together
with Criticisms and Suggestions for Reform, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 45 (1981).
55. J. AREEN, FAMILY LAw 593 (2d ed. 1985).
56. See id. 593-95.
57. See, e.g.. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 489 N.E.2d 712, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743
(1985) (medical license); Majauskas v. Majauskas, 61 N.Y.2d 481, 474 N.Y.S.2d 699, 463
N.E.2d 15 (1984) (pensions). See generally Freed & Walker, supra note 53, at 408-09 (Table
V) and 419 (Table VI).
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ship of an asset in the marital pot is subordinated to equitable considerations.58
As the substance of the divorce action has expanded, so has its procedure. Today, a divorce action is generally conceived of as civil litigation
like any other, with some special variations for the nature of the case. For
example, before equitable distribution, pretrial disclosure in divorce actions was severely limited. With its advent, pretrial financial disclosure
is now extremely broad, encompassing a searching examination of the
parties' assets.5 9 Today, spouses in many states have to file disclosure
statements listing their assets, liabilities, and needs with each other and
the courts. 60 The usual discovery tools of depositions and document demands are largely available in divorce actions.

D. Divorce and Res Judicata:Current Status
The expanded concepts of res judicata and the expanded divorce action
have not, however, fully merged. Taken as a group, state courts are profoundly ambivalent about requiring Wendy to join her tort claim against
Hal with her divorce action. That ambivalence is expressed in different
definitions of the scope of the res judicata effect given to divorce judgments.
Some courts seem to believe that a divorce action is sui generis, a unique
form of action with limited preclusive effect in future civil actions. 6' They
give resjudicata a minimal effect, roughly equivalent to that of a judgment
under the common law forms of action. The "same transaction" test is
essentially ignored by courts adhering to this line of analysis.
Other courts acknowledge the same transaction test to be the governing
standard, yet treat interspousal torts filed after a judgment of divorce as
an exception to an otherwise "liberal [transactional] approach to what

58. See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236Blc (McKinney 1988) (" 'marital property' shall
mean all property acquired by either or both spouses during the marriage ... regardless of
the form in which title is held").
59. See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236B4 (McKinney 1988) (requiring compulsory
disclosure of spouses' financial states); Lehman v. Lehman, 179 Cal. App. 3d 558, 224 Cal.
Rptr. 572 (1986); Hamstead v. Hamstead, 357 S.E.2d 216 (W. Va. 1987), revd on other
grounds, 364 S.E.2d 794 at 798 (W. Va. 1987).
60. See, e.g., 22 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. A-I (McKinney 1989) (New York net
worth statement); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.13 (1981); W. VA. CODE § 48-2-33(a) (1986) (net
worth statement authorization).
61. E.g., Slansky v. Slansky, 150 Vt. 627, 556 A.2d 94 (1988) (tort claim arising out of
marriage is not barred by the "'stringent requirements for the application of the doctrine of
resjudicata"); Weil v. Lammon, 503 So. 2d 830, 832 (Sup. Ct. Ala. 1987) (concurring opinion)
("[A]ctions for divorce are sui generis"); Lord v. Shaw, 665 P.2d 1288, 1291 (Sup. Ct. Utah
1983) ("A divorce action is highly equitable in nature, whereas the trial of a tort claim is at
law ... the administration of justice will be better served by keeping the two proceedings
separate").
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constitutes a cause of action." 62 Finally, still other courts articulate the
same transaction test and apply it broadly to divorce judgments, treating
them essentially the same for purposes of res judicata as judgments in
63
other modern civil actions.
The trend of both modern procedure and modern divorce law supports
the last view. The overwhelming advantage of the same transaction analysis is that it emphasizes function, not form. It looks behind labels and
compels careful and pragmatic analysis of the reasons and policies why
disputes should or should not be combined into a single litigation unit.64
Applying it to divorce actions serves the basic purposes of modern divorce
law and the policies of judicial economy and litigant repose.

V. Transactional Analysis, Divorce, and
Interspousal Torts
A. The Governing Standards
The Restatement (Second) of Judgments, the fullest expression of the
transactional approach to res judicata, defines transaction as "a natural
grouping or common nucleus of operative facts."65 Determining whether
a factual grouping constitutes a transaction is a pragmatic determination
which considers factors such as: (1) whether the facts are closely connected
in time, space, origin, or motivation; (2) whether they form a convenient
litigation unit; and (3) whether treating them as a single transaction con66
forms with the parties' expectations.
Under these tests, Wendy should be required to file her tort claim in
her divorce action against Hal. In most cases, an interspousal tort action
filed subsequent to a divorce judgment should be held to be part of the
"same transaction" as the divorce judgment and barred by res judicata.

B. Common Factual Grouping
Wendy's divorce and interspousal tort claim share two common factual
groupings. First, at least in fault divorce states, the grounds for both
overlap.
More significantly, however, in both fault and no-fault states, both the
62. Aubert v. Aubert, 129 N.H. 422, 529 A.2d 909, 912 (1987) ("[Nlarrow exception to
[the] traditional interpretation of... resjudicata"). Accord, Nelson v. Jones, 787 P.2d 1031
(Sup. Ct. Alaska 1990); Nash v. Overholser, 114 Idaho 461, 757 P.2d 1180, 1181 (1988).
63. E.g., Simmons v. Simmons, 773 P.2d 602 (Col. App. 1988) (concurring and dissenting
opinion); Weil v. Lammon, 503 So. 2d 830 (S.Ct. Ala. 1987); Tevis v. Tevis, 79 N.J. 422,
400 A.2d 1189, 1196 (1979); Partlow v. Kolupa, 122 A.D.2d 509, 504 N.Y.S.2d 870 (3d
Dep't 1986), affd nern. 69 N.Y.2d 927, 509 N.E.2d 327, 516 N.Y.S.2d 632 (1987).
64. Comment, The Entire Controversy Doctrine:A Novel Approach to Judicial Efficiency,
12 SETON HALL 260, 289 (1982) (discussing New Jersey rule).
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 comment b (1982).
66. Id.
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divorce and tort claims must be satisfied from a common pot of marital
assets. Wendy's divorce and tort action, in effect, make two separate, but
overlapping, claims for an extra share of the single pool of assets that she
and Hal have accumulated during their marriage. Reflecting fairness and
efficiency concerns, the rules of procedure generally require that all claims
to a common pot of assets be asserted in the single distributional proceeding or be lost.67 Wendy's tort and divorce claims should be treated
similarly.
1. THE

SUBSTANTIVE GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE AND TORT

(a) Fault divorce
The story of Wendy and Hal does not specify whether the jurisdiction in
which they live has eliminated all fault grounds for divorce. In a state
which retains the traditional fault divorce ground of "cruel and inhuman
treatment," there is an obvious factual overlap between the action for
divorce and an interspousal tort. Cruel and inhuman treatment is generally defined as "conduct of the defendant that . .. so endangers the
physical or mental well-being of the plaintiff as renders it unsafe or improper to cohabit with the defendant." 6 The deliberate or negligent transmission of a sexual disease committed during the marriage seems to fit
this definition; it can be both cruel and inhuman treatment and the basis
of a tort action. If Hal and Wendy did not settle their divorce claim, in
a fault divorce state Wendy's complaint for divorce surely would include
allegations of cruel and inhuman 69treatment based on transmission of the
herpes virus, as well as adultery.
The factual overlap between grounds for divorce and the tort action in
fault divorce states is ironically illustrated by cases which simultaneously
hold that: (a) the res judicata effect of the divorce judgment does not
preclude the plaintiffs subsequently filed interspousal tort; but (b) collateral estoppel does preclude the defendant's relitigation of liability and
causation in the tort action because of a finding of a marital fault in the
divorce action.70 Preclusion principles in these cases are available as a
sword, but not as a shield. The result is some unfairness to the tortfeasor,
who is deprived of his right to a jury trial on the tort claim, should he
want one.

67. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 22 (interpleader); Bankruptcy Act, I I U.S.C. § 501(c) (1983)
and Bankruptcy R. 3001 & 3002 (generally requiring filing of proof of claim in bankruptcy

or its loss).
68. N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 170(1) (McKinney 1988).
69. Wendy might also seek to use her infection with the herpes virus as proof of Hal's
adultery. Cf Schepard, AIDS and Dirorce, 23 FAM. L.Q. 1,18-19 (1989) (discussing whether
a spouse's infection with the AIDS virus is proof of adultery in a divorce).
70. McCoy v. Cooke, 165 Mich. App. 662, 419 N.W.2d 44, 46 (1988); Noble v. Noble,
761 P.2d 1369, 1375 (Sup. Ct. Utah 1988).
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(b) No-fault divorce
The factual overlap between the grounds for the divorce action and the
tort action in pure no-fault divorce states is far less evident. Some courts,
in effect, treat no-fault divorce as divorce on the demand of one spouse,
without inquiring into the reasons why the spouse wants a divorce. 7' In
those states, since grounds for divorce are not required, there is little
factual overlap between the grounds for divorce and the interspousal tort.
There is some danger that compulsory joinder of a tort claim in a divorce
action will raise the level of acrimony between the spouses in the divorce
proceeding. 72 Indeed, the increase in availability of remedies for interspousal torts is a very strong argument for complete elimination of fault
73
grounds altogether.
No-fault jurisdictions thus have a difficult policy choice to make about
whether Wendy should be required to join her tort action with her claim
for divorce. Joinder may defeat the very purpose of no-fault divorce reform. On the other hand, as will be discussed subsequently, the economic
relief available to Wendy in the divorce action significantly overlaps with
the economic relief that can be awarded in the tort judgment, and both
are likely to come from a single marital pot. It is thus both fair and
efficient to coordinate Wendy's tort and divorce awards in a single proceeding.
Probably the most practical solution is to join the tort and divorce
claims even in a no-fault state. The court could, however, grant the nofault divorce, but stay the entry of judgment, before hearing the facts
underlying the tort action, the tort damage claim and the divorce-related
claims for economic relief.7 4 That way, the purposes of the no-fault divorce law are preserved, and the economic relief in the tort and divorce
action coordinated as well.
2. ECONOMic AWARDS

In fault states, then, there will be a considerable factual overlap between
the substantive grounds on which Wendy makes her divorce and tort
claims. The factual overlap between her actions is dramatically amplified
when possible economic relief on both claims is factored into the equation. Indeed, one commentator states that "[tihe propriety of treating a
tort award as part of the benefited spouse's financial resources is the
71. Few judges deny divorce requests in no-fault jurisdictions. Generally, if one party
requests a divorce in such states it is granted. J. AREEN, supra note 55, at 272-73.
72. Cf Chiles v. Chiles, 779 S.W2d 127 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1989) (action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress cannot be joined with a divorce action because to do so
"'would bring fault back to divorce, undermining years of reform").
73. Note, supra note 17, at 510.
74. See N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 3212(e)(2) (McKinney 1989) (allowing court to enter
summary judgment but withhold entry of the judgment "'pending the determination of any
remaining cause of action"). Cf FED. R. Civ. P. 56(d) (describing procedures for cases in
which partial summary judgment is rendered but trial is still required on other issues).
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strongest justification for the ... position that the tort and the divorce
must be litigated together."' 5
(a) Punishment
The economic relief granted in both tort and divorce actions is based on
a mixture of principles of punishment and compensation for injury based
on projections of past loss and future need. Punitive damages may be
available in a tort action to punish the wrongdoer and deter others. Punitive damages can be awarded by a jury in a tort action in many states
if the tortfeasor acted with express or implied malice. In setting the punishment, the jury considers the tortfeasor's ability to pay damages. The
amounts of punitive and compensatory damages awarded by the jury need
76
not be proportional.
The role of fault in divorce-related economic distributions is analogous
to the standard for awards of punitive damages in tort actions. In many
states, a spouse's fault can be considered in either marital property distribution or maintenance awards, or both. 77 For example, in New York,
whose equitable distribution statute is silent on the role of fault in property and maintenance awards, courts can consider conduct which "shocks
the conscience" in distributing property. 7 Serious batteries and other
tortious conduct could presumably be taken into account under this standard. 79 The intermediate courts of appeal in New York are divided on
the question whether less egregious levels of marital fault (such as adultery) can be considered in setting maintenance awards. s0
Thus, there is an element of possible punishment in both divorce-related economic distributions and an award of punitive damages in the
tort action. It simply would not be fair to Hal to be doubly punished in

75. Note, supra note 17, at 514.
76. See Browing-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 2909, 2922, n.24
(1989) (describing law of punitive damages in Vermont and stating it is "'typical of the law
in most American jurisdictions").
77. Freed & Walker, supra note 53, at 408-09 (Table V).
78. E.g., O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 589, 489 N.E.2d 712, 719, 498 N.Y.S.2d
743, 750 (1985); Blickstein v. Blickstein, 99 A.D.2d 287, 472 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1984).
79. A New York trial court recently held, for example, that a husband's rape of his
stepdaughter was "'especially repugnant or horrific conduct" that could be taken into account
in equitable distribution because it inflicted psychological damage and resulted in economic
loss on the wife from inability to work. Thompson v. Thompson, 16 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA)
1125 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Cty. Jan. 5, 1990).
80. Compare Stevens v. Stevens, 107 A.D.2d 987, 484 N.Y.S.2d 708 (3d Dep't 1985)
and Nolan v. Nolan, 107 A.D.2d 190, 486 N.Y.S.2d 415 (3d Dep't 1985) (egregious marital
fault can be taken into account in maintenance awards) with Wilson v. Wilson, 101 A.D.2d
536, 476 N.Y.S.2d 120 (1st Dep't 1984), appeal denied, 67 N.Y.2d 667, 476 N.E.2d 1006,
487 N.Y.S.2d 1027 (1985) and Maloney v. Maloney, 114 A.D.2d 440, 494 N.Y.S.2d 356 (2d
Dep't 1985) (generally excluding marital fault from consideration in fashioning maintenance
awards).
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two separate, uncoordinated civil actions for his egregious fault.' If a
choice has to be made between the two actions, no-fault divorce and
associated economic relief, combined with a tort action based on fault,
seems to be the more sensible course to follow.
(b) Compensation

Tort awards of compensatory damages generally consist of three components: (1) compensation for pain, suffering, and actual physical harm;
(2) compensation for lost income and for medical expenses; and (3) compensation for loss of consortium. 8 2 There are two possible overlaps between the compensatory damages award and economic relief in the divorce
action. In some states, a portion of the recovery for personal injuries may
belong to the marital estate. Second, principles guiding jury awards of
compensatory damages overlap with principles used by divorce courts to
distribute marital property and award maintenance to the injured spouse,
raising the potential for double recovery.
In a majority of equitable distribution states personal injury awards are
marital property. Other states, by statute, define personal injury awards
as separate property. Indeed, some jurisdictions conceive of the tort action
as an "asset" of the injured spouse that should be disclosed on the financial disclosure statements generally required in a divorce action.13 Finally,
some states separate compensatory damages into components and hold
that compensation for pain and suffering is separate property of the injured spouse, compensation for lost earnings is marital property, and
compensation for loss of consortium is separate property of the uninjured
spouse."4

Depending on the law of the state, Hal might thus claim that some
portion of Wendy's tort recovery belongs to the marital estate, or to him.
The idea that Hal is entitled to share in Wendy's recovery when: (a) he
caused the injuries; and (b) he would not share in the recovery if Wendy

81. Texas apparently solves this problem by allowing fault to be considered in the divorce
distribution, or the tort claim, but not both. Note, supra note 17, at 508. This solution, of
course, deprives one party or the other of a jury trial right on the punitive damages claim,
if the divorce action is decided first.
82. Note, Johnson v.Johnson: PersonalInjury Awards In DivorceActions, 65 N.C.L. REV.
1332. 1335 (1987).
83. Heacock v. Heacock, 402 Mass. 21, 25 n.3 520 N.E.2d 151, 154 n.3 (1988). New
York's financial disclosure form requires disclosure of a spouse's "causes of action." Statement of Net Worth, N.Y. COMP. CODEs R. & REGS. Appendix A-1
IV M (McKinney
1989). Other courts have, however, held that the tort claim is too speculative to require
disclosure. Stuart v. Stuart, 143 Wis. 2d 377, 421 N.W. d 505, 509 (1988); McNevin v.
McNevin, 447 N.E.2d 611, 617 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983). This holding is obviously in tension
with the notion that intangible assets should be included in the marital "pot" for distribution.
84. See Note, supra note 82, at 1334 n.21.
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and he were not married, is, however, highly objectionable. 5 It sounds
much like the argument of the child who murders his father, and then
pleads for mercy because he is an orphan. It might be possible to dismiss
Hal's claim on the principle that a tortfeasor should not profit from his
own wrong. 6 Wendy's personal injury award should thus be classified as
her separate property, and Hal should have no claim for loss of consortium.

Realistically, Hal's payment of the tort award comes in the form of a
higher percentage of the marital estate being awarded to Wendy or from
Hal's separate property, if he has any. The size of the tort award to Wendy
is, however, potentially much greater than her share of the marital estate,
since the tort award is not conceptually limited by the amount of assets
available for distribution, or Hal's income.87
The danger of double recovery by Wendy arises, however, because economic awards in divorce judgments incorporate principles of compensation similar to those considered by juries in making personal injury
awards. For example, New York's equitable distribution statute requires
the divorce court to consider the following factors in determining how to
distribute marital property: "the probable future financial circumstances
of each party," ' the "age and health of both parties," 89 and "any award
of maintenance.- 90 The potential overlap between tort compensatory
damages and divorce economic awards is even more evident when the
factors a New York court must consider in setting a maintenance award
to Wendy are listed: the "age and health of both parties"; 9' "the present
and future earning capacity of both parties"; 92 "the ability of the party
seeking maintenance to become self-supporting"; 93 and "any other factor
which the court shall expressly find to be just and proper."94 Applying
these need-based principles, courts have increased maintenance awards
to spouses because of medical necessity and lost income. 95
85. Indeed, the argument that the husband "owned" the wife's recovery even though he
was the torifeasor was one of the conceptual arguments that supported the now discredited
rule of interspousal tort immunity. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 116 at 880 (3d ed.
1964). Presumably, courts would not want to revive this concept in more modern garb.
86. See J. OLDHAM, DIVORCE, SEPARATION AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY §
8.01[31 at 8-8-8-10 (1989).
87. Note. supra note 17, at 505.
88. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW. § 236(B)(5)(d)(8) (McKinney 1988).
89. Id. § 236(B)(5)(d)(2).
90. Id. § 236(B)(5)(d)(5).
91. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(6)(2) (McKinney 1988).
92. Id. § 236(B)(6)(3).
93. Id. § 236(B)(6)(4).
94. Id. § 236(B)(6)(I I).
95. See Kuhn v. Kuhn, 134 A.D.2d 900, 521 N.Y.S.2d 929 (1987) (court rejects claim
duration of maintenance to wife should be limited to the length of the marriage because the
wife is in poor health and is unlikely to find self-supporting employment); Antis v. Antis,
108 A.D.2d 889, 485 N.Y.S.2d 770, 771 (1985) (trial court maintenance award to wife raised
in light of her mental illness and disfigurement due to burns); Rodgers v. Rodgers, 98 A.D.2d
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In summary, Hal faces the prospect of Wendy's multiple economic
claims because of her single injury from the following sources: (1) fault
and need taken into account in property distribution; (2) punitive damages; (3) tort compensatory damages; and (4) fault and need taken into
account in maintenance payments. Even courts which hold that a divorce
judgment does not preclude a subsequent tort claim recognize this extensive overlap between divorce awards and tort damages and the danger of
overcompensation it raises. For example, they increase maintenance to
the injured spouse and allow the tortfeasor spouse to raise the increased
96
payments as a setoff in the tort action.
Thus, while it is formally correct to say that damages for personal
injuries cannot be recovered in a maintenance award in a divorce action, 97
the principles and facts underlying the awards overlap. There are, however, significant practical differences between personal injury damages
and maintenance awards. A maintenance award is, for example, taxable
to the payee and deductible to the payor; tort compensation for pain and
suffering is not taxable to the payee, though punitive damages can be.98
Maintenance may be modifiable in the future; 99 tort judgments are not.
Such considerations, however, only heighten the need for the parties, their
lawyers, and the court to carefully coordinate and, if necessary, distinguish
between the types of economic payments awarded to Wendy.
The divorce court oversees a highly discretionary distribution of Wendy
and Hal's marital assets which can take many different forms. Wendy's
tort recovery is a significant factor in the overall picture. The judgments
that have to be made to coordinate the types and sizes of Hal's payments
to Wendy because of his tortious conduct and their dissolved marriage
relationship are complex and interrelated. It would thus be highly efficient
for both the judicial system and the parties to determine the dissolved
family's financial future in a single judgment rather than seriatim. 00

386, 389, 470 N.Y.S.2d 401, 404 (1983) (increased maintenance award to wife in poor health
to assist her in maintaining standard of living and to make health insurance payments). See
also McBane v. McBane 553 S.W.2d 521 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (court retains jurisdiction to
increase maintenance award if wife's physical condition deteriorates further).
96. McCoy v. Cooke, 165 Mich. App. 662, 419 N.W.2d 44, 46 (1988); Noble v. Noble,
761 P.2d 1369, 1373-74 (Sup. Ct. Utah 1988). Cf Hill v. Hill, 415 So. 2d 20 (Sup. Ct. Fla.
1982) (decision to keep interspousal tort immunity in marital tort actions combined with
divorce claim and ordering trial courts to consider scope of injury and need for compensation
in maintenance award).
97. Auber v. Aubert, 129 N.H. 422, 529 A.2d 909, 912 (Sup. Ct. N.H. 1987); Heacock
v. Heacock, 402 Mass. 21. 24, 520 N.E.2d 151, 153 (1988).
98. Note, supra note 17. at 506.
99. Note. supra note 82. at 1349, n. 131 (describing North Carolina law on modification
of maintenance).
100. An interesting example of a complex combined tort and divorce action is Carmichael
v. Carmichael, 15 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1617 (Super. Ct. D.C. Oct. 20, 1989). The parties
stipulated to a joint court trial of a combined malpractice and divorce action brought by the
wife against her psychologist-husband who, the wife claimed, took advantage of her vulnerability and wealth. The court awarded the wife $1 million for the malpractice but did not
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C. Convenient Trial Unit
I. THE ADVANTAGES OF COMBINATION:
SIMMONS V. SIMMONS

The factual overlap between the grounds and remedies in the divorce and
tort actions alone makes Wendy and Hal's marriage and Wendy's tort
claim a "convenient trial unit." Another way to consider this issue is to
illustrate the procedural inefficiency that results when the tort and divorce
actions are not combined.
In Simmons v. Simmons,'0 ' for example, it took seven years and two
appeals to get back to ground zero because the tort and divorce proceedings were not treated as a single litigation unit. The husband won a partial
summaryjudgment in the separate divorce action based on an antenuptial
agreement. The wife then won a large tort award after a separate jury
trial, during which her lawyers argued that she should be granted a large
tort award because the antenuptial agreement limited her recovery in the
divorce action. The wife won a reversal of the divorce court's decision
on the antenuptial agreement; the husband then won a reversal of the tort
decision on the grounds of unfair prejudice due to the references to the
antenuptial agreement before the jury. Thus, despite the extensive proceedings in both the divorce and tort actions, the Simmonses are no closer
to finalizing their economic rights against each other than they were when
they began. The result is a wasteful allocation of their own and society's
limited resources for resolving disputes. The only people who profited
from keeping the divorce and tort actions separate were the Simmonses'
lawyers.
2.

THE PROBLEMS OF JURY TRIAL IN A

COMBINED ACTION

The principal barrier to the efficiencies of combination are fears that
Wendy will lose her right to a jury trial in a combined proceeding.
The Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution preserves
the right to jury trial as it existed at common law in 1791, the date of the
Amendment's ratification by the original states. 0 2 While the Seventh
Amendment is not applicable to the states, almost all of them have similar
state constitutional guarantees which are similarly interpreted. °3
Modern divorce statutes and practice generally place the fact-finding

consider that aspect of his misconduct again in the very complex equitable distribution award
resulting from the divorce action.
101. 773 P.2d 602 (Colo. App. 1988).
102. FRIEDENTHAL, KANE & MILLER, supra note 8, § 11.3 at 480.
103. Id. § 11.7 at 503.
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power in divorce cases in a judge, rather than a jury. 10 4 This is in part a
result of the history of granting divorce in ecclesiastical/equity courts. A
divorce litigant had no right to a jury trial at English common law because
there was no action for divorce. The action for separation from bed and
board was administered by judges in ecclesiastical courts. Equity courts,
however, had the power to compel a husband to maintain his wife. The
separation of church and state generally prohibited ecclesiastical courts
in this country. The American practice, however, relying on the closest
English precedent, was to treat divorce actions as equitable. 05°
There are other reasons that most divorce practice takes place before
judges, not juries. Distributing a marital estate often requires complex
accounting of the parties' mutual claims against each other. Historically,
such complex accounting was performed by equity, not law, courts, not
juries. 0 6 Wardship proceedings too are classical proceedings in equity, 07
as are claims for breach of fiduciary duty. 0 8
Tort claims, which usually involve a single lump sum award are, in
contrast, classically "legal." A tort plaintiff is generally entitled to a jury
trial.' 0 9 The problem thus arises about how to arrange a jury trial for
Wendy's tort claim, while keeping the fact-finding for and administration
of the divorce in the judge's hands.
No one, presumably, wants to add juries to divorce court in any major
way. There are thus two realistic possibilities for managing the problems
ofjury trial in Wendy's combined tort and divorce action against Hal: (1)
try the tort claim before a jury first, then incorporate its factual findings
and damage award in the judge's divorce decree; (2) have both the tort
and divorce claims decided by a judge.
Most states, like the federal system,"10 have merged law and equity into
a trial court of general jurisdiction which is empowered to grant divorce
and tort relief."' In a merged court system, jury trial can be preserved in
a single presentation of evidence for legal and equitable claims by simply
mandating the order in which the claims are decided. In federal practice,

104. See Kiser v. Kiser, 325 N.C. 502, 385 S.E.2d 487 (1989) (no right to jury trial under
North Carolina Constitution in equitable distribution action). Some states, by statute, provide for jury trial for fault aspects of a divorce action. New York, for example, allows a
litigant to request a jury trial on issues of grounds for fault divorce. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW §
173 (McKinney 1988).

105. D.

DOBBS, REMEDIES

§ 2.1 at 25, n.4 (1973) citing 4 J. POMEROY,

EQUITY JURIS-

1119-20 (5th ed. 1941).
106. ld§ 4.3 at 252-54.
107. See T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 164 (5th ed. 1956).
108. D. DOBBS, supra note 105, § 2.3 at 37.
109. E.g., Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195-96 (1974).
110. FED. R. Civ. P. 1-2.
111. This conclusion is based on a review of the Comparator which compares the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure with the civil procedural statutes and rules of states within each
federal appellate circuit. Comparator, One Form of Action, Federal Procedure Rules Service,
F.R.C.P. I and 2 (1989-90).
PRUDENCE §§
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absent compelling necessity, legal issues must be decided before equitable
issues when the two are combined." 2 A similar rule could be imposed in
state practice for a combined divorce and tort action." a The judge would
make his divorce decision and distribution taking into account the jury's
verdict and award of damages in the tort action.
A diametrically opposed line of reasoning is followed in New Jersey,
whose courts treat tort claims as "incidental" to the divorce action and
allow the judge to decide it without a jury." 4 Unlike the Seventh Amendment federal guarantee,"I5 New Jersey's state constitutional guarantee of
jury trial is subject to the inherent jurisdiction of the courts of equity to
adjudicate ancillary and incidental matters. It thus permits combined
6
divorce and tort actions to be decided by a judge without a jury."1 Similarly, in states which have not merged law and equity, the equity "cleanup" doctrine might give a court of equity the power to award tort damages
7
in a combined divorce and tort action without a jury."
Whether other states can adopt the New Jersey rule, or use the "cleanup" doctrine to eliminate jury trials in combined tort and divorce actions
depends on their construction of their state constitutional guarantees of
jury trial. A basic question of fairness is, however, raised by the problem.
Wendy would be entitled to a jury trial on her tort claim if she and Hal
were not married. There does seem to be something inherently unfair
about denying her a jury trial for the same claim simply because she is
married and seeking both a divorce and tort judgment. The jury is the
conscience of the community in tort cases, articulating and imposing
minimum standards of civilized behavior. Since we have made a policy
decision to allow married people to sue each other for tort, the jury should
perform the same function for married plaintiffs and defendants as for
the unmarried. Wendy should get a jury trial on her tort claim, especially
since it is entirely feasible for the legal system to provide it and still
combine her divorce and tort actions.
3.

COMPLICATION OF THE DIVORCE ACTION

(a) Different retaineragreements
It is also possible to manage the problem that contingent fee retainer
agreements are permissible in tort actions but not in actions for divorce.
The simplest solution is for Wendy's lawyer to enter into two separate
112. Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962); Beacon Theaters, Inc. v. Westover, 359
U.S. 500 (1959).
113. The Utah Supreme Court recently imposed such a rule for divorce and tort actions
arising out of the same marriage, though it ruled that the two claims should proceed in
separate lawsuits. Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369, 1371 (1988).
114. Apollo v. Kim Anh Pham, 192 N.J. Super. 427, 470 A.2d 934 (1983); Davis v. Davis,
182 N.J. Super. 397. 442 A.2d 208 (1982).
115. See cases cited in note 112 supra.
116. Apollo v. Kim Anh Pham, 192 N.J. Super. 427, 470 A.2d 934, 936 (1983).
117. See Liles v. Liles, 289 Ark. 159, 711 S.W.2d 447 (1986).
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retainer agreements with her, one for the divorce and the other for the
tort claim. He can charge Wendy on an hourly basis for the divorce action,
establish a contingent fee arrangement for the tort claim, and keep separate time records. While there will be, no doubt, some overlap between
the divorce and the tort claim, Wendy's lawyer should be able to roughly
estimate how much time he is spending on each without too much difficulty.
Whatever the retainer agreement, Wendy's attorney's fees are likely to
be paid from Hal's share of the marital estate. The possibility of overlap
and duplication between the attorney's fees awards for Wendy in the tort
and the divorce action seems a strong argument that the size of each
should be monitored by one judge, not two.
(b) Additional claims and parties
Another concern about a combined divorce and tort action is that vital
interim determinations-particularly on custody issues-will be delayed
while the complicated combined action proceeds to trial." 8, Divorce courts
are, however, generally empowered to make interim determinations on
such issues on motion pending final judgment.' 9 Interim economic and
custody judgments can be made rapidly without losing the administrative
benefits of combining the divorce and tort action in a single proceeding
for final judgment.
Furthermore, should the combined action prove too difficult to manage,
either party could make a motion to sever claims for separate trial.120 A
court also has the power, in appropriate cases, to keep the combined
divorce and tort action relatively simple by denying joinder of third parties and claims whose addition will complicate and delay the action because of the marginal issues they interject. 2' Discretionary judicial
management of combined tort and divorce actions is a more useful method
to deal with the problems that result from combining tort and divorce
actions than absolute rules that treat them as different causes of action.
118. Stuart v. Stuart, 143 Wis. 2d 377, 421 N.W.2d 505, 507-09 (1988).
119. For a description of the possible requests for temporary orders in a divorce action
see Ploetz. Precomnencement Strategy'in I FAMILY LAW AND PRACTICE § 2.03 at 12-15-293 (1988).
120. E g.. N.Y. CIv. PRAc. L. & R. § 4011 (McKinney 1990) (giving court power to regulate
sequence of issues tried): Cf FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b) ("The court, in furtherance of convenience
or to avoid prejudice, or where separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy,
may order a separate trial of any claim ... or of any separate issue or any number of claims
121. See Chiacchio v. Chiacchio, 198 N.J. Super. 1,486 A.2d 335 (1984) (denying joinder
of insurance company that denied coverage of plaintiff wife's claim as third party defendant
to a combined divorce and tort action on grounds that husband's claim of indemnification
from the insurance company is contractual and does not arise out of the marriage relationship). See also J.Z.M. v. S.M.M., 226 N.J. Super. 642, 545 A.2d 249, 252 (1988) (despite
general rule requiring consolidation of tort and divorce action, court declines to consolidate
postdivorce marital tort action with ongoing custody modification proceeding because tort
action "'does not bear on a continuing family relationship").
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D. Expectations of the Parties and Social Practice
The most difficult question to answer in applying the same transaction
test to interspousal tort actions filed after a divorce judgment is whether
doing so best serves public policy, as measured by the expectations of the
parties.
Certainly, there are an unknown number of spouses, mostly wives, who
will not file a tort claim with a divorce action for fear of further enraging
their already abusive spouse. If encouraging the victim of domestic violence
to file a tort claim is the primary value to be maximized in designing a
procedural system for combined tort and divorce actions, the post-divorce
tort claim should generally be allowed.' 2 2 One would hope, however, that
better ways can be found to provide victims of domestic violence with
physical and psychological security123 without distorting the transactional
thrust of modern civil procedural and divorce reform to do so.
Furthermore, an explicit exception could be made to transactional analysis if a spouse can meet the burden of showing "excusable neglect" in
not filing her tort claim in the divorce action. 24 Excusable neglect could
be defined to include a credible and documented fear of retaliation if the
claim were filed with the divorce action. A history of previous physical
abuse by the tortfeasor would go a long way toward establishing the necessary excusable neglect. The burden of persuasion, however, should be
on the spouse who seeks to utilize the exception.
The problem with allowing Wendy to file her tort claim after the divorce
is concluded without good cause is that there may be less sympathetic
reasons for her decision than fear of what Hal would have done to her if
she filed the claim earlier. Wendy may, for example, have become dissatisfied with the economic settlement achieved in the divorce and use
the subsequently filed interspousal tort action as a back-door method of
reopening negotiations.
While there is nothing inherently evil in using the threat of a tort claim
to increase a spouse's share of a marital settlement, allowing the threat
to be made after the divorce has seemingly concluded is far more troublesome. However distasteful Hal may be, he may rightly perceive that
he has been "sandbagged" when Wendy files her tort action. 25 After all,
he had no warning of what Wendy and her lawyer had in store for him.
122. Stuart v. Stuart, 143 Wis. 2d 377, 421 N.W.2d 505, 507-08 (1988).
123. For a recent effort, see Finn, Statutor' Authoritv in the Use and Enforcement ofCivil
Protection Orders Against Domestic Abuse, 23 FAM. L.Q. 43 (1989).
124. See Brown v. Brown, 208 N.J. Super. 372, 506 A.2d 29, 34 (1986) (while "entire
controversy" doctrine generally bars subsequently filed marital tort, wife's claim in particular
case is not barred from filing claim because lawyer in divorce action was advised of tort
claim and refused to raise it).
125. Nash v. Overholser, 114 Idaho 461, 757 P.2d 1180, 1185 (1988) (Bisiline, J. concurring). Cf Boronow v. Boronow, 71 N.Y.2d 284, 290, 519 N.E.2d 1375. 1379, 525 N.Y.S.2d
179, 183 (1988) ("The courts and the parties should ordinarily be able to plan for the
resolution of all issues relating to the marriage relationship in the single action").

154

Family Law Quarterly, Volume XXIV, Number 2, Summer 1990

The clause in the separation agreement that states Wendy and Hal have
made full disclosure to each other reinforces Hal's belief that his relationship with Wendy has been fairly terminated. Hal's expectation that
he can move on with his postdivorce life has proven to be sadly mistaken. 2 6 One can ohly speculate whether Hal's rage will be greater at
being deceived by a false sense of security and stability than it would
have been had the tort claim been dealt with during the divorce negotiations.

VI. Conclusion
The scope of res judicata applied to interspousal tort claims filed after
divorce should ultimately reflect a vision of what society wants the divorcing process to look like. One vision, furthered by issue and claimbased analysis of res judicata and its limited application, is that the spouses
are adversaries. They have the right to engage in strategic behavior that
maximizes their economic welfare, even if a touch of deception is involved.127 An alternate vision, promoted by transactional analysis, is that
while the spouses are adversaries, they-and society-have an important
interest in encouraging candor in their settlement negotiations 2 and com-

126. It might, of course, be argued that Hal can protect himself against Wendy's subsequent
tort action by insisting on a general release in the divorce settlement negotiations. Hal-or
more accurately, his lawyer-probably should have done so. Such broad general releases
seem to be standard operating procedure in sophisticated matrimonial settlement agreements,
at least in New York. See S. SCHLISSEL, SEPARATION AGREEMENTS AND MARITAL CONTRACTS
§ 9.02 at 260 (1986) (sample clause). At least one court has interpreted a general release in
a separation agreement of "all ... claims arising or growing out of [the] marital relationship .. " to bar a spouse who knew she had a tort claim identical to Wendy's, but failed to
inform her divorce lawyer of the claim, from asserting it in subsequent litigation. Overberg
v. Lusby, 727 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Ky. 1990). Other courts, however, might not reach the
same result. See Abbott v. Williams, 888 F.2d 1550, 1555-56 (1 lth Cir. 1989) (narrowly
interpreting separation agreement which did not contain a general release under Alabama
law to permit assertion of subsequently filed interspousal tort). Some treat marital tort claims
as too speculative to be included as assets for purposes of pretrial financial disclosure. See
cases cited in note 83 supra.These courts might well interpret a general release clause as not
including a "speculative" asset. Other courts interpret general release clauses narrowly, holding that for the release to be effective, the particular property released must be specifically
described in the separation agreement or divorce decree. E.g., Yeo v. Yeo, 581 S.W.2d 734,
738-39 (1979); Lebeau v. Lebeau, 258 Pa. Super. 519, 393 A.2d 480, 483 (1978).
127. In Stuart v. Stuart, 143 Wis. 2d 377, 421 N.W.2d 505, 509 (1988), the Wisconsin
Supreme Court vacated the intermediate Court of Appeals holding that a tort claim was an
asset that had to be disclosed during divorce negotiations. The Supreme Court reasoned that
an asset was not forfeited if not disclosed, as perjury and constructive trusts are available as
remedies. The intermediate Court of Appeals reasoned that the tort action had to be disclosed,
and that "[flailing to disclose a known asset is a serious matter." It held, however, that the
husband had not been prejudiced by nondisclosure, as any damages he would have to pay
would come from his separate property or his interest in marital property. Stuart v. Stuart,
140 Wis. 2d 455, 410 N.W.2d 632, 637 (1987).
128. "Agreements between spouses, unlike ordinary business contracts, involve a fiduciary
relationship requiring the utmost of good faith. There is a strict surveillance of all transactions
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plete resolution of all issues between them in a single negotiation or proceeding. 29 This second vision is supported by the general direction of
both modern procedure and divorce law. It also is more workable, and
ultimately more morally compelling and socially useful than its competitor.

between married persons, especially separation agreements. Equity is so zealous in this respect
that a separation agreement may be set aside on grounds that would be insufficient to vitiate
an ordinary contract." Christian v. Christian, 42 N.Y.2d 63, 72, 365 N.E.2d 849, 855, 396
N.Y.S.2d 817, 822-23 (1977).
129. See Stuart v. Stuart, 143 Wis. 2d 377. 421 N.W.2d 505, 510 (1988) (Steinmetz, J.
concurring) (rules of procedure should encourage divorce attorneys to put claims on table
during settlement negotiations).

